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NOT THE KING'S BENCH 
Edward A. Hartnett* 
Speaking at a public birthday party for an icon, even if the 
honoree is one or two hundred years old, can be a surprisingly 
tricky business. Short of turning the party into a roast, it seems 
rude to criticize the birthday boy too harshly. On the other hand, 
it is at least as important to avoid unwarranted and exaggerated 
praise.1 The difficult task, then, is to try to say something re-
motely new or interesting while navigating that strait. 
The conference organizers did make it easier for me in one 
respect: My assignment does not involve those ideas for which 
Marbury is invoked as an icon. It is for others to wrestle in well-
worn trenches with exalted arguments about judicial review and 
its overgrown descendent judicial supremacy, while trying to 
avoid unseemly criticism or fawning praise. I, on the other hand, 
am to address more technical issues involving section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 and its provision granting the Supreme 
Court the power to issue writs of mandamus. 
The proper interpretation of section 13 has continued to be 
of interest long after Marbury, largely because the question of 
judicial review of an Act of Congress only arises after that Act is 
interpreted. That is, a court must first interpret a statutory provi-
sion before it is confronted with the choice of whether to follow 
that statutory provision or instead follow a constitutional provi-
sion that would call for the case to be decided differently. 
As anyone attending this birthday party already knows, the 
court in Marbury interpreted section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 to provide the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to 
issue the prerogative writ of mandamus to federal officers such 
• Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thanks to Howard Erichson, 
James Pfander, Robert Pushaw, participants in a faculty workshop at Notre Dame Law 
School, and the other celebrants at the birthday party for helpful comments. 
1. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Carle Hulse, Divisive Words: The Republican 
Leader; Bush Rebukes Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond, N.Y. TIMES Al (Dec. 13, 2002) 
(recounting President Bush's criticism of Senator Lott's comments at Senator Thur-
mond's one hundredth birthday party). 
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as Secretary of State James Madison, but refused to issue such a 
writ because to do so would exceed the original jurisdiction per-
mitted the Supreme Court by Article III of the Constitution. 
For years, scholars have contended that Marshall's interpre-
tation of section 13 was seriously flawed, if not downright dis-
honest. Recent scholarship, however, has defended Marshall's 
interpretation of the statute as correct. My point today is not so 
much to attempt to resolve this dispute, but instead to suggest 
that what is particularly worth celebrating on Marbury's birthday 
is that the Supreme Court cared what that statute said, believed 
that what that statute said mattered, and rejected a view of itself 
as this nation's equivalent of the King's Bench. 
I. SECTION 13 OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was no minor piece of legislation. 
Although commonly known by that name, its formal name bet-
ter reveals its importance, "An Act to establish the Judicial 
Courts of the United States." Until it was signed into law on 
September 24, 1789, the government under the new constitution 
had no judicial branch. Congress had convened on March 4, 
1789, although obtaining a quorum took a bit longer, and Presi-
dent Washington was inaugurated on April 30, 1789.2 But until 
Congress and the President acted to create the federal judiciary, 
it did not and would not exist. 
This was obviously true as to the inferior federal courts, 
which are constitutionally optional. Unless and until the law-
making process specified in Article I created inferior federal 
courts, there would be no such courts. But it is also true as to the 
Supreme Court, which the constitution requires but says re-
markably little about, omitting even such obviously necessary 
specifics as the number of judges that constitute the Supreme 
Court. Until an Act of Congress spelled out such specifics, there 
would be no Supreme Court either. 
The Judiciary Act of 1789, then, created the federal judici-
ary. It provided that the Supreme Court would consist of a chief 
justice and five associate justices.3 It divided the country into 
thirteen districts, with a district court and district judge for each 
2. See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 153 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
ed., 1993). 
3. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. 73. 
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district.4 The districts were then grouped into three circuits, 
called the eastern, middle, and southern circuits.5 But it did not 
provide for the appointment of any circuit judges; the Supreme 
Court justices and the district judges were the only national judi-
cial officers under the Judiciary Act of 1789. It did not even cre-
ate circuit courts for each of these circuits, which is why we 
never hear of cases decided by the United States Circuit Court 
for the Middle Circuit. Instead, it provided for a circuit court for 
each district (other than the districts of Maine and Kentucky) 
consisting of two justices of the Supreme Court and the local dis-
trict judge. The district courts were given jurisdiction of minor 
criminal cases, as well as admiralty and maritime cases,6 while 
the circuit courts were given jurisdiction of diversity suits, and 
suits by the United States (both subject to a five hundred dollar 
amount in controversy requirement), plus the entire range of 
criminal cases.7 The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction 
over certain civil actions decided by the circuit courts,8 as well as 
appellate jurisdiction over final decisions by state courts reject-
ing federal claims and defenses.9 
All of these federal courts were given the power to issue all 
writs, "not specially provided for by statute," which were "neces-
sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agree-
able to the principles and usages of law," and all of these judges 
were given the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to inquire 
into the cause of commitment of those in federal custody.10 
4. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 2. Nine of the districts- the districts of New Hampshire, 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina 
and Georgia-were coextensive with state lines. The other four districts were created by 
subdividing two states into two districts each. The state of Massachusetts contained both 
the district of Maine and the district of Massachusetts, while the state of Virginia con-
tained both the district of Kentucky and the district of Virginia. No district courts were 
created for Rhode Island or North Carolina, as neither state had yet ratified the new con-
stitution. 
5. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 4. The eastern circuit consisted of the districts of New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York, the middle circuit of the districts 
of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, the southern circuit of 
the districts of South Carolina and Georgia. The districts of Maine and Kentucky were 
not allocated to any circuit. 
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9. A minor criminal case was one "where no other pun-
ishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred 
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted." 
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11. 
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22. Significantly, there was no appeal from a circuit 
court judgment in a criminal case. 
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25. 
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14. 
286 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:283 
The point of this thumbnail sketch of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 is to provide context for Marbury, both by recalling how 
different the federal judicial structure at that time was from the 
structure we now seem to take for granted, and by situating sec-
tion 13 of the Judiciary Act in the Act as a whole. Let us turn, 
then, to section 13 itself. 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides: 
And be it further enacted, that the Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, 
where a state is a party, except between a state and its citi-
zens; and except also between a state and citizens of other 
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but 
not exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have exclusively all such 
jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or 
other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic ser-
vants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with 
the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, 
or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the 
trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at 
law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The 
Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the 
circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases 
herein after specially provided for; and shall have power to is-
sue writs of prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding 
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of 
mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of 
law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under 
authority of the United StatesY 
The key language for Marbury, of course, is in the final sen-
tence, providing that the Supreme Court "shall have power to 
issue ... writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles 
and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding 
office, under the authority of the United States." 
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13. The punctuation and capitalization follow the ver-
sion of the Act contained in the Statutes at Large, 1 Stat. 73, 80. Professor James Pfander 
reports that earlier and more historically accurate versions divide the provision regarding 
appellate jurisdiction from the provisions regarding mandamus by a colon or a dash 
rather than a semicolon, and capitalize the letter "A" in the provision regarding manda-
mus. James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervi-
sory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1539-46 (2001). Cf Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291,296 (2002) ("of-
fering what [the authors] immodestly think is the most comprehensive analysis ever writ-
ten on the linguistic meaning and original understanding of the Constitution's use of 
semicolons"). 
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Many scholars have argued that Marshall's interpretation of 
section 13 was wrong, and that Marshall should have interpreted 
section 13 not to apply in Marbury at all. If section 13 did not 
apply, of course, there would be no basis for reaching the consti-
tutional question decided in Marbury. Indeed, for some, Mar-
shall's interpretation of section 13 was so egregiously wrong that 
it can only be understood as a wilful misinterpretation of section 
13 undertaken precisely in order to reach the constitutional 
questionY 
There are two variants of this criticismY On the first vari-
ant, the mandamus power in section 13 applies only in cases 
within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Since the pro-
vision regarding mandamus is contained in the same sentence as 
the provision regarding appellate jurisdiction, the mandamus 
grant could be understood as simply an aspect of that appellate 
jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction-
because the case is one of the "cases herein after specially pro-
vided for"- then it may issue writs of mandamus to carry out 
that appellate jurisdiction. If not, it has no power to issue writs of 
mandamus. Since Marbury was not one of those appeals "herein 
after specially provided for," this line of argument leads to the 
conclusion that there was no statutory basis for issuing the writ 
and Marbury should have lost without the court ever deciding a 
constitutional question. 
On the second variant, the mandamus power in section 13 is 
a remedy available to the Supreme Court in both original juris-
diction cases and in appellate jurisdiction cases, but only if there 
is already a case properly before the court. 14 As Professor Amar 
12. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 389 (1982) (describ-
ing Marbury, including its interpretation of section 13, as "intellectually dishonest"). Cf 
Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 
18 CONST. COMMEI"T. 607, 623-27 (2001) (suggesting that Marshall might have orches-
trated the bringing of the case to the Supreme Court precisely in order to resolve the case 
as he did). 
13. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Cricical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 15; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Jusciciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393,446-47 (1996); EDWARDS. CORWIN, 
THE DOCfRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-9 (1914); David P. Currie, The Constitution in 
the Supreme Court: The Powers ofche Federal Courcs, 1801-1835,49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 
653 (1982). 
14. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 453-64 (1989). In an article published shortly be-
fore this paper went to press, Professor Louise Weinberg attempts to defend Marbury 
from such criticisms. Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2003). 
Rather than defend Marshall's statutory interpretation, however, she asserts that Mar-
shall did not construe the statute at all. 1d. at 1310 ("'I am unable to locate the 'statutory 
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puts it, "the mandamus clause is best read as simply giving the 
Court remedial authority-for both original and appellate juris-
diction cases- after jurisdiction (whether original or appellate) 
has been independently established."15 This interpretation would 
likewise call for Marbury to lose on statutory grounds rather 
than constitutional grounds, because there was no other basis 
(independent of the mandamus clause itself) for him to invoke 
either the Supreme Court's original or appellate jurisdiction. 
The difference is that this variant would read section 13 as per-
mitting the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in origi-
nal jurisdiction cases, such as ambassador suits. 
Marshall's interpretation of the statute has recently been 
defended by Professor Pfander. In part, Pfander's argument is 
typographical: He observes that many critiques of Marshall's in-
terpretation rely (in part) on the close connection between the 
provision regarding appellate jurisdiction and the provision re-
garding mandamus, and contends that earlier and more histori-
cally accurate renderings of section 13 show a more forceful 
separation of the two provisions. In particular, these earlier ver-
sions depict the provision regarding appellate jurisdiction di-
vided from the provision regarding mandamus by a colon or a 
construction' of which Marbury's critics complain."). Taking a startlingly strong version 
of the principle that statutes should be construed so as to render them constitutional, she 
contends that while "Marshall undoubtedly held that the mandamus clause of Section 13 
would be unconstitutional if read as a jurisdictional grant, he did not so read it himself. 
He could not so read it himself, because, as he held, it would be unconstitutional if so 
read." /d. at 1311 (emphasis in original). Under this approach, it is difficult to see how 
any statute could actually be unconstitutional: Any time an interpreter thought that a 
statute, if read in a particular way, would be unconstitutional, that interpreter could not 
read the statute that way. Yet in Weinberg's hands, the principle is not used to avoid con-
stitutional decisions, but instead to facilitate avowedly hypothetical constitutional deci-
sions. That is, while Weinberg contends that Marshall did not and could not have con-
strued the statute to bear an unconstitutional meaning, she also contends that Marshall 
simply accepted the statutory construction proferred by Lee as counsel for Marbury. /d. 
at 1321. ("Marshall simply accepted, for purposes of stating the problem, the best hy-
pothesis as to jurisdiction that Charles Lee offered.") She finds it perfectly appropriate-
indeed, ordinary-for a court to simply accept a party's construction of a statute and then 
test that construction against the constitution. The result is that the court renders a hypo-
thetical constitutional ruling: '"If you read the statute as authorizing jurisdiction in this 
case, then the statute would be unconstitutional."' /d. at 1334 (emphasis in original); see 
id. at 1339 (describing such hypothetical constitutional rulings as "the familiar rhetoric of 
constitutional rulings 'as applied"'); see also id. at 1335-36 (arguing against what she 
views as excessive constitutional avoidance). Thus Weinberg effectively turns the princi-
ple of constitutional avoidance on its head, as if to say, "Don't bother with statutory in-
terpretation, just assume that the statute means what the litigant asserts it means and de-
cide whether a statute thus interpreted would be constitutional." This is not the place for 
a full response to Weinberg's arguments; here I simply note that, in my view, to describe 
a decision as a hypothetical constitutional ruling serves to criticize, not defend, it. 
15. Amar, supra note 14, at 456. 
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dash rather than a semicolon, and capitalize the letter "A" in the 
provision regarding mandamus. 16 
More substantively, Pfander observes that mandamus, as a 
"high prerogative writ" developed by the Court of King's Bench, 
was not "a judicial remedy for use in actions otherwise properly 
before the court," but instead a "freestanding source of judicial 
authority that suitors were free to invoke by petition to the court 
in the first instance. "17 Specifically, as Blackstone put it, the pre-
rogative writ of mandamus was "a command issuing in the king's 
name from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, 
corporation, or inferior court of judicature, within the king's 
dominions; requiring them to do some particular thing therein 
specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which 
the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least 
supposes, to be consonant to right and justice."18 In this respect, 
it dovetailed with sovereign immunity: the king could "do no 
wrong," so that if wrong was done, "his ministers [were] ac-
countable for it to the people. "19 Indeed, Pfander notes that 
"lawyers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
would have found ... an ancillary 'remedial power' understand-
ing of the writ of mandamus quite mysterious."20 
While there is much to be said for Pfander's defense of Mar-
shall's interpretation of section 13, as I noted at the outset, my 
goal here is not to attempt to resolve the dispute regarding the 
proper interpretation of section 13. Instead, what I celebrate 
today is that the Marbury court thought that the question of 
statutory interpretation mattered. The Marbury court did not 
simply declare itself the American nation's equivalent of the 
King's Bench, empowered by the constitution to issue preroga-
tive writs, but instead treated its powers to issue prerogative 
writs as subject to legislative control. 
16. Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1539-46. 
17. /d. at 1524-25. 
18. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *110; see a/so id. at *264-65 (pre-
rogative writ of mandamus "issues from the court of king's bench, commanding, upon 
good cause shewn to the court, the party complaining to be admitted or restored to his 
office"); S.A. de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 40, 53 (noting that 
wnt of mandamus "expressly alleged a contempt of the Crown consisting in the neglect 
of a public duty"). 
19. 3 BLACKSTONE at *254-55. See also 1 BLACKSTONE at *239 (noting that if it 
appeared that the king had wrongly granted a franchise or privilege, the law "declares 
that the king was deceived," either by his agents or by persons who deceived those 
agents). 
20. Pfandcr, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1524. 
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This may seem to some to be a celebration of the trivially 
obvious, and therefore hardly worthy of celebration. But it was 
not so obvious in 1803, and there are those today who do not 
treat it as obvious. 
II. THEPATHNOTTAKEN 
When former Attorney General Charles Lee, arguing in 
Marbury's behalf before the Supreme Court, turned from the 
factual issues to the legal issues, he did not begin with section 13. 
Instead, he began with the practice of the King's Bench, con-
tending that the Supreme Court of the United States, like the 
King's Bench, must have the power to issue the prerogative writs 
of mandamus and prohibition: 
This is the supreme court, and by reason of its supremacy 
must have the superintendence of the inferior tribunals and 
officers, whether judicial or ministerial. In this respect there is 
no difference between a judicial and ministerial officer. From 
this principle alone the court of king's bench in England de-
rives the power of issuing the writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion. 3 Inst. 70, 71. Shall it be said that the court of king's 
bench has this power in consequence of its being the supreme 
court of judicature, and shall we deny it to this court which 
the constitution makes the supreme court? It is a beneficial, 
and a necessary power .... 21 
It was only after reviewing Blackstone's description of the 
writ of mandamus and arguing that the "appellate jurisdiction" 
provided for in Article III of the constitution should be taken in 
"its largest sense," and "broadest sense," that Lee turned to sec-
tion 13.22 Even then, Lee did not treat section 13 as creating the 
power, but instead merely as "recogni[zing]" the power.23 
As Pfander has demonstrated, Charles Lee was far from 
alone in linking a "supreme" court with the King's Bench, and 
thereby to the power to issue the prerogative writs such as man-
damus, habeas corpus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari. 
21. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-47 (1803), reprinted in 1 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45-46 (Kurland & Casper ed., 1978). Moreover, the Su-
preme Court had previously entertained at least three applications for mandamus to ex-
ecutive officials. See Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1573-74. But see Weinberg, su-
pra note 14, at 1322-28 (attempting to reconcile these cases with Marbury). 
22. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 147-48. 
23. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 148. 
2003] NOT THE KING'S BENCH 291 
State courts in numerous states had done so.24 The key, however, 
was not the name of the court. Instead, as the Supreme Court 
later explained, the key was that "where the common law is 
adopted," the "highest court of original jurisdiction" was treated 
as the equivalent of the King's Bench with "general supervising 
power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers. "25 While each 
state did adopt the common law,26 they were not consistent in 
the nomenclature for their courts. For example, in Pennsylvania, 
that "highest court of original jurisdiction" was called the "Su-
preme Court,"27 but in Maryland, in contrast, it was called the 
"General Court. "28 
Today, we tend to think of supreme courts as appellate 
courts at the apex of a judicial hierarchy, often with considerable 
discretion to select their own cases. At the founding, however, 
state supreme courts were trial courts, distinguished from other 
courts because they had broader (frequently general) subject 
matter jurisdiction and state-wide personal jurisdiction rather 
than circumscribed subject matter and personal jurisdiction.29 
They were not necessarily the highest court in a state, but might 
24. Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1534-35 (citing authority from Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia). 
25. Kendall v. United States ex rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 621 (1838). 
26. See, e.g, STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE 
ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECfiC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 57 
(1991) (noting that "in time each state was to pass a statute indicating that the English 
common law, insofar as it was consistent with American institutions, was to be in force"). 
27. See Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Origins of 
the King's Bench Power, 32 Duo. L. REv. 525, 525-29 (1994) (noting that the colonial 
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania was explicitly given the power of the King's Bench, and 
the 1776 Constitution provided that the supreme court would have "the powers usually 
exercised by such courts"). 
28. See MARYLAND CONSTITUTION of 1776, art. 56; see also Kendall, 37 U.S. at 631 
(Taney, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "the general court was, in the state of Maryland 
precisely what the court of king's bench was in England"). 
29. See David E. Engdahl, What's In a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple 
"Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. L. J. 457,473 (1991) (noting that the adjective "supreme" car-
ried the connotation of "nationwide (or statewide) geographical competence"); id. at 
503-04 (noting that "the hierarchical design of the judicial department taken for granted 
today is not the design with which our federal history began, and is by no means what the 
text of the Constitution requires"); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc-
tural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1180 
n.139 (1992) (noting that the words "supreme" and "inferior" were probably used in the 
same sense in the Constitution as in Blackstone's Commentaries: to distinguish between 
courts "subject to narrow geographic and subject matter restraints" and courts not sub-
ject to such restraints). See also WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE 
JUDICIARY Acr OF 1789, at 35 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (noting that "the 
basic court system structure in 1787-89 ... was horizontal. There were different levels of 
courts, which meant by definition that some were 'superior' and some were 'inferior.' All 
were trial courts.") (emphasis in original). 
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be subject to another court's appellate jurisdiction, just as the 
House of Lords exercised appellate jurisdiction over the King's 
Bench.30 
While Marshall, following Lee, did discuss the nature of the 
writ of mandamus and invoke Blackstone before turning to the 
Judiciary Act, he did not make any assertion that the Supreme 
Court of the United States inherited the jurisdiction of the 
King's Bench, nor did he claim that it has any powers at all based 
on being the "supreme court." Instead, as soon as Marshall 
posed the question whether mandamus "can issue from this 
court," he quoted section 13 of the Judiciary Act: 
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States au-
thorizes the supreme court "to issue writs of mandamus, in 
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any 
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the author-
ity of the United States. "31 
30. See generally Engdahl, supra note 29, at 468-72 (describing the various state ju-
dicial structures at the founding). For example, "between 1780 and 1806, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania was inferior to the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Pennsyl-
vania." Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709,711 n.8 (Pa. 1978). Simi-
larly, prior to the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
"possessed the Great Powers of the court of King's Bench in England," with the power to 
issue "the great prerogative writs of King's Bench," but was not the highest court. 
ARTHUR MURPHY, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY UNDER THE NEW 
JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS OF 1844 AND 1947 at 3 (1952). The 1947 Constitution created a 
new "Supreme Court" at the apex of a judicial hierarchy, N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2, and a 
"Superior Court" with general state-wide jurisdiction in all cases, N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3, 
1 1, while providing that "prerogative writs are superceded and, in lieu thereof, review, 
hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court ... as of right, except in crimi-
nal cases where such review shall be discretionary." N.J. CoNST. art. 6, § 5, 'I 4. 
The older understanding of a "supreme" court has not been lost completely. For example, 
the Supreme Court of New York is a trial court, not the highest court in the state, and does have 
the authority to issue the modem-day descendants of the prerogative writs. See, e.g., Sanford v. 
Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 547,573 (1974) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (noting that with "the mod-
ernization of our civil practice, article 78 was adopted to consolidate the prerogative writs into 
one type of proceeding"). There is nevertheless a tendency to view New York's terminology as 
an oddity, rather than as a surviving renmant of tradition. 
Pfander argues that the House of Lords did not exercise appellate jurisdiction in prerogative 
writ cases. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Super-
vise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1433, 1449 (2000). 
31. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173. At least under current principles of quotation, an ellip-
sis should have been included between the word "issue" and the word "writs" to indicate 
the omission of the intervening phrase concerning writs of prohibition. One should be 
hesitant, however, before accusing Marshall of deliberate distortion, considering that the 
Supreme Court at the time of Marbury lacked an official reporter, that the first official 
reporter, Henry Wheaton, was promised "any written opinions [the Justices] might pre-
pare, or notes they might make in connection with their oral opinions," that the prior 
unofficial reporters frequently published what they could from "opinions ... often ex-
temporaneously delivered from only the most rudimentary notes," and that the Court did 
not provide for the filing of its opinions with its clerk until 1834. See Craig Joyce, The 
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He certainly did not claim that section 13 merely "recog-
nized" the Supreme Court's inherent authority to issue preroga-
tive writs. 
Marbury's explicit holding is that Congress lacked the con-
stitutional authority to bestow original mandamus jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court, beyond the cases allocated by Article III to 
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Implicitly, however, it 
indicates that whether the Supreme Court is empowered to issue 
a particular prerogative writ depends, in the first instance, on 
whether Congress authorized it to do so.32 
Subsequent decisions similarly make clear that the inferior 
federal courts cannot issue writs of mandamus without Congres-
sional authorization.33 When the Supreme Court in 1838 ulti-
mately held that the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
had the power to issue mandamus to federal officers, it rested on 
two statutory provisions: one provided that the laws of Mary-
land-which had adopted the common law of England- were 
continued in force in that part of the district that had been ceded 
from Maryland,34 and a second that gave that court all of the 
powers of the circuit courts created by the Judiciary Act of 
1801.35 At the same time, the Supreme Court observed that its 
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court As· 
cendency, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1298 n.46, 1321, 1328, 1343 (1985); see also 6 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 164 (Charles Hobson ed., 1990) ("No manuscript of the 
[Marbury] opinion survives."). 
32. Cf James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219,249 (1992) (noting that 
Marshall "quickly set aside the question of the availability of common law remedies ... 
because the appropriate remedy was available by legislative provision"). 
33. Mcintire v. Wood, 11 U.S. 504 (1813) (holding that the circuit courts lacked the 
power to issue writs of mandamus); Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine 453, 22 F. Cas. 575, 576, 
No. 13,064 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1825) (refusing mandamus and noting that the circuit court 
"has not the like superintending authority over the district courts, as the king's bench in 
England, and the supreme court of this state have over inferior tribunals" and that "in 
the sense of the constitution, the circuit as well as the district courts are inferior courts, 
and their respective jurisdiction is pointed out by acts of congress"). Ironically, the au-
thor of the Wood decision, Justice William Johnson, while holding the circuit court, had 
previously issued a writ of mandamus to a collection officer, provoking a firestorm of 
criticism. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D. S.C. 1808) (No. 
5,420); See GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 298-303 (1981). See also 
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598 (1821) (holding that the state courts lacked jurisdiction 
to issue mandamus to federal officers). 
34. Kendall v. United States ex rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 619-20 (1838); see also id. at 
621 (noting that the "common law has not been adopted by the United States, as a sys-
tem m the states generally, as has been done with respect to this district"). 
35. ld. at 624-25 (concluding that the statutory reference was to the circuit courts 
created by the Judiciary Act of 1801, even though that act was repealed). Whether the 
same conclusion would have been reached in 1803 if Marbury had sought mandamus in 
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own power to issue mandamus was "not exercised, as in Eng-
land, by the king's bench, as having a general supervising power 
over inferior courts," but rather only as provided by statute.36 
Habeas corpus. The idea, implicit in Marbury, that whether 
the Supreme Court is empowered to issue a particular preroga-
tive writ depends, in the first instance, on whether Congress au-
thorized it to do so, was made explicit just a few years later in 
another landmark case, Ex parte Bollman,37 which involved a dif-
ferent prerogative writ, the prerogative writ of habeas corpus. 
Habeas corpus was a "high prerogative writ ... issuing out of the 
court of king's bench not only in term-time, but also during the 
vacation, by a fiat from the chief justice or any other of the 
judges, and running into all parts of the king's dominions: for the 
king is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of 
any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be 
inflicted. "38 
Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout were arrested on 
charges of treason and committed for trial by the circuit court of 
the District of Columbia for the County of Washington. Counsel 
for Swartwout, none other than Charles Lee again, petitioned 
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Counsel for 
Bollman, Robert Harper, did the same. Having lost in Marbury, 
Lee did not argue that since the King's Bench had the power to 
issue the prerogative writ of habeas corpus, so too did the Su-
preme Court of the United States?9 Instead, he analyzed the Ju-
the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia is unclear. Compare Bloch, supra note 12, 
at 617 (claiming that there is "good reason to believe Marbury and his colleagues would 
have prevailed in the Circuit Court") with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Con-
stitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 52 n.271 (2003) (claiming that "it seems highly doubtful that the Court, in the 
politically charged atmosphere of 1803, would have upheld the authority of the D.C. 
Courts to order mandamus relief for William Marbury against James Madison"). Con-
gress, of course, could have abolished the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia as 
easily as it did the circuit courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1801. 
36. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 621-22. See also Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212 
(1803) (quashing writ of error to General Court of Northwest Territory because Con-
gress had not provided for Supreme Court review of decisions of that court); HASKINS & 
JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 621 (describing Clarke as "further evidence that all of the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was the product of a constitutional grant as im-
plemented by legislative action; absent one or the other of these vital elements, the Court 
refused to expound a theory of residual superintendence of federal courts as a founda-
tion for its jurisdiction"). 
37. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). Indeed, in Kurland and Casper's collection of 
landmark briefs, Bollman follows immediately after Marbury. 
38. 3 BLACKSTONE at *131. 
39. The closest he came was in arguing that since the Supreme Court derives its 
power and jurisdiction, "not from a statute, but from the constitution itself," and "no act 
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diciary Act in detail.40 Harper, on the other hand, began his ar-
gument in terms much like those used by Lee in Marbury: 
The general power of issuing this great remedial writ, is inci-
dent to this court as a supreme court of record. It is a power 
given to such a court by the common law. Every court pos-
sesses necessarily certain incidental powers as a court. ... 
These powers are not given by the constitution, nor by stat-
ute, but flow from the common law .... [T]he power of issuing 
writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of relieving from ille-
gal imprisonment, is one of those inherent powers, bestowed 
by the law upon every superior court of record, as incidental 
to its nature, for the protection of the citizen.41 
Harper argued that the "question might be safely rested" on 
"this ground alone." When he turned to the statutory basis for 
the issuance of habeas corpus, section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, he noted that the statutory argument was "not stronger in-
deed."42 
The court, speaking again through Marshall, emphatically 
rejected the argument that it could issue the prerogative writ of 
habeas corpus without statutory authorization. At the very out-
set, the opinion states: 
As preliminary to any investigation of the merits of this mo-
tion, this court deems it proper to declare that it disclaims all 
jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the 
United States. Courts which originate in the common law pos-
sess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common 
law, until some statute shall change their established princi-
ples; but courts which are created by written law, and whose 
jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that 
jurisdiction. 
The court responded to counsel's argument by acknowledg-
ing that "resort may unquestionably be had to the common law," 
to determine the meaning of the term habeas corpus, but insisted 
that "the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the 
United States, must be given by written law." While the court 
put to one side whether statutory authorization was necessary 
for courts to exercise power "over their own officers, or to pro-
of Congress has taken ... away" the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, "[n]o legisla-
tive act is necessary to give powers to this court." 8 U.S. at 77. 
40. 8 U.S. at 77-79. 
41. 8 U.S. at 79-80; Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 57-58. 
42. 8 U.S. at 83; Kurland & Casper, supra note 21, at 61. 
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teet themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the 
exercise of their functions," it was explicit that for the court to 
decide "any question between individuals, or between the gov-
ernment and individuals," the power "must be given by written 
law." It therefore framed the question for decision as "whether 
by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United 
States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a 
case ... has been given to this court. "43 
It concluded that just as section 13 of the Judiciary Act em-
powered the Supreme Court to issue the prerogative writ of 
mandamus to federal executive officials, so, too, section 14 of the 
Judiciary Act empowered the Supreme Court to issue the pre-
rogative writ of habeas corpus.44 In contrast to Marbury, how-
ever, the court found that section 14 could be utilized in Bollman 
as a constitutional exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate ju-
risdiction because the writ sought "the revision of a decision of 
an inferior court. "45 
Prohibition. Prohibition was the "king's prerogative writ ... 
directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any inferior court, 
commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof ... [be-
cause] the cause ... does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to 
the cognizance of some other court."46 The Supreme Court simi-
larly understood that its power to issue writs of prohibition was 
controlled by statute. Section 13 empowered the Supreme Court 
to issue the prerogative writ of prohibition to the districts courts, 
when those courts were proceeding as courts of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.47 
By 1845, when moving for the Supreme Court to issue a writ 
of prohibition to a district court sitting in bankruptcy, counsel 
43. 8 U.S. at 93-94. See Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1599 (noting that "Mar-
shall's decision to disavow the Court's inherent supervisory powers runs parallel to his 
retreat to written law, and seems to anticipate his similar insistence in Ex parte Bollman 
that the power of the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus ... must rest on statu-
tory law"). 
44. 8 U.S. at 94-100. See also Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193,201 (1830) (stating that 
"the judicial act authorizes this court, and all courts of the United States, and the judges 
thereof, to issue the writ 'for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment"'). 
45. 8 U.S. at 100-01. For an argument that Bollman was wrongly decided, see ERIC 
M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 29-45 
(2001 ). 
46. 3 BLACKSTONE at *112. See also de Smith, supra note 18, at 49-50 (noting that 
the prerogative character of prohibition "has been repeatedly stressed" and that the pur-
pose of the writ is not so much to protect private interests but rather to ensure that the 
royal prerogative has not been violated by a departure from the prescribed order for the 
administration of justice). 
47. Judiciary Actof1789, § 13. 
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noted that "in the King's Bench this would be clearly a case for a 
prohibition," but admitted that the Supreme Court "does not 
possess, in such cases, an authority coextensive with that of the 
King's Bench."48 He argued instead that the express grant of au-
thority to issue writs of prohibition in admiralty and maritime 
cases was made "out of abundant caution," and that the Su-
preme Court could issue the writ of prohibition under section 14 
because the writ was "necessary for the exercise of the Supreme 
Court's appellate powers. "49 
The problem with this argument was that, under the statu-
tory scheme then in effect, the Supreme Court did not have ap-
pellate jurisdiction over the district courts sitting in bankruptcy, 
making it difficult to see how the writ of prohibition was neces-
sary to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. As Justice 
Catron succinctly put it, "By the 14th section of the Judiciary 
Act this court has power to issue writs proper and necessary for 
the exercise of its jurisdiction; having no jurisdiction in any given 
case, it can issue no writ: that it has none to revise the proceed-
ings of a bankrupt court is our unanimous opinion. "50 
Counsel also contended that if the Supreme Court could not 
issue prohibition to a district court sitting in bankruptcy, then 
"its authority to revise the proceedings of inferior tribunals [and] 
to confine them within the limits of their jurisdiction ... is so far 
completely nullified. "51 The Court responded: 
But it is objected, that the jurisdiction of the District Court is 
summary in equity and without appeal to any higher court. 
This we readily admit. But this was a matter for the considera-
tion of Congress in framing the act. Congress possesses the 
sole right to say what shall be the forms of proceedings, either 
in equity or at law, in the courts of the United States; and in 
what cases an appeal shall be allowed or not. It is a matter of 
sound discretion, and to be exercised by Congress in such a 
manner as shall in their judgment best promote the public 
convenience and the true interests of the citizens .... Because 
there is no appeal given, it by no means follows, that the ju-
risdiction is either oppressive or dangerous. No appeal lies 
from the judgments either of the District or Circuit Court in 
criminal cases; and yet within the cognizance of one or both of 
those courts are all crimes and offenses against the United 
48. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292,306 (1845) (argument of Wilde). 
49. !d. at 306-07. 
50. /d. at 322 (Catron, J., concurring). 
51. /d. at 307 (argument of Wilde). 
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States, from those which are capital down to the lowest mis-
demeanors, affecting the liberty and the property of the citi-
zens. And yet there can be no doubt that this denial of appel-
late jurisdiction is founded in a wise protective public policy.52 
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to issue the prerogative 
writ of prohibition because Congress had not given it statutory 
authority to do so, even if that meant that the district court's de-
cision could not be reviewed. 
Quo warranto. Quo warranto, which makes it onto some 
(but not all) lists of prerogative writs,53 was "in the nature of a 
writ of right for the king, against him who claims or usurps any 
office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he sup-
ports his claim, in order to determine the right. "54 If available, it 
might have presented the best opportunity for the circuit judges 
who lost their supposedly life-tenured offices when the Judiciary 
Act of 1801 was repealed to challenge the constitutionality of the 
repeal. But the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not mention quo war-
ranto, and none of the judges sought the writ.55 Justice Chase, 
52. /d. at 317 (opinion of the Court, delivered by Story, J.). The Court went further, 
adding, "[W]e know of no case where this court is authorized to issue a writ of prohibi-
tion to the District Court, except in the cases expressly provided for by the 13th section 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 ... that is to say, where the District Courts are 'proceeding 
as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' /d. Under current law, the Supreme 
Court may issue writs of prohibition to district courts in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, 
derivative of the courts of appeals, over the district courts. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 
(1943). 
53. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts and 
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 802 (listing certiorari, quo warranto, 
habeas corpus, prohibition, and mandamus); de Smith, supra note 18, at 42 (giving de-
tailed consideration to the "four main prerogative writs," not including quo warranto); 
ROBERT L. STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 498 (8th ed., 2002) (noting that 
the "principal extraordinary writs are mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, and certio-
rari"). 
54. 3 BLACKSTONE at *262. 
55. Charles Warren reports that a "suit was instituted by one of the deposed Circuit 
Judges in the 3d Circuit in New Jersey, Joseph Reed v. Joseph Prudden, presenting the 
question of the constitutionality of the repealing Act of 1802, and the power of the Su-
preme Court Judges to sit in the Circuit Courts," but gives no further information about 
the case. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 272 
n.l (revised edition, 1926). This description is dubious, given that neither Reed nor 
Prudden were among the displaced circuit judges. For the names of the displaced circuit 
judges, see Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1961). 
Professor Wythe Holt states that the plaintiff was former Senator Jacob Read of 
South Carolina who had been appointed to the district court but "was denied his seat 
when the sitting district judge refused to accept the appointment" as circuit judge. Wythe 
Holt, "[I]f the Courts have firmness enough to render the decision:" Egbert Benson and 
the Protest of the "Midnight Judges" Against Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, in 
EGBERT BENSON: FIRST CHIEF JUDGE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1801-02) at 73 n.61 
(Wythe Holt & David A. Nourse, eds., 1987). He adds that little is known about the 
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who thought the repeal unconstitutional, urged his Supreme 
Court colleagues to refuse to hold the circuit courts in place of 
the displaced circuit judges, in part because neither mandamus 
nor quo warranto was available as a remedy. 56 
There was no scheduled session of the Supreme Court in 
which Chase could attempt to persuade his colleagues in person, 
Congress having effectively ad)ourned the Court from Decem-
ber 1801 until February 1803. 7 The Justices did, however, ex-
plain their views to each other by letter.58 Chief Justice Marshall 
suit-including why it was brought in New Jersey-and that "the New Jersey federal 
court records for this period have been discarded." /d. This description is dubious as well. 
Two different newspaper accounts of the case, including the one cited by Holt, spell the 
plaintiff's name "Reed," not "Read," and neither so much as mentions that the plaintiff 
was a former United States Senator or had been appointed as a United States District 
Judge. See NEW ENGLAND PALLADIUM, April 19, 1803; WASHINGTON FEDERALIST, 
April 23, 1803 (reproducing story from the Charleston Courier). Moreover, even apart 
from the implausibility of a former United States Senator from South Carolina seeking to 
litigate a dispute about a seat on the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina before a court in New Jersey, it is difficult to imagine how anyone ap-
pointed to an Article III judgeship in anticipation that the incumbent judge would vacate 
the office could think that he had any sort of claim to that office if the incumbent judge 
declines to vacate it. Finally, and quite tellingly, the case was brought in the October 1801 
term of the circuit court, see id.; that is after the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 
but before its repeal in 1802. 
Far more likely, then, the case was an ordinary private civil suit that, as filed, pre-
sented no question about the constitutionality of a repeal that had yet to occur. The con-
stitutionality of the repeal subsequently arose because the case had been filed before a 
circuit court created by the Judiciary Act of 1801, Congress repealed that Act, directing 
(as the contemporary newspaper accounts put it) "that all proceedings in the 3rd Circuit 
shall be transferred to a Circuit Court to be holden by justice Paterson, and judge Morris, 
on the 1st of October 1802, for the district of New Jersey," and the defendant "came be-
fore those judges ... and pleaded against their holding cognizance of the action thus 
brought before them." /d. 
56. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall, April 24, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 109, 113, also reprinted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, 
supra note 33, at 172 n.182. See also O'Fallon, supra note 32, at 248 (noting that the Jack 
of a remedy for the displaced circuit judges "returns to one of the central issues of the 
repeal debate-whether the federal courts could have recourse to the common law"). 
Eleven of the displaced circuit judges submitted memorials to the Senate asserting 
that they had been unconstitutionally deprived of their offices and compensation, and 
noting that their right to compensation, "will cheerfully be submitted to judicial examina-
tion and decision, in such manner as the wisdom and impartiality of Congress may pre-
scribe." /d. A Senate committee did present, without recommendation, a resolution call-
ing on the President "to cause an information, in the nature of quo warranto, to be filed 
by the Attorney General against Richard Bassett, one of the [displaced circuit judges], 
for the purpose of deciding judicially on their claims." HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 
33, at 178-79. The proposal "triggered Republican sensitivities to the common Jaw pre-
tensions of the federal courts" and was defeated. O'Fallon, supra note 32, at 240, 248. 
57. See O'Fallon, supra note 32, at 219, 239 (noting that as "a result" of Congres-
sional alteration of the terms of the Supreme Court, "the next meeting of the Court 
would be after the Justices had to decide whether to resume their circuit riding duties"). 
58. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson, April 19, 1802, in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 108-09 ("It having now become apparent 
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noted his "strong constitutional scruples" against "the perform-
ance of circuit duty by the Judges of the supreme court," but also 
his view that the constitutional question had been decided by 
past practice.59 Justice Washington agreed that the question was 
settled by past practice,60 as did Justice Cushing,61 and Justice 
Paterson.62 Observing that while the "burthen of deciding so 
momentous a question . . . would be very great on all of the 
Judges assembled," an "individual Judge, declining to take a Cir-
cuit, must sink under it," Justice Chase urged a meeting of the 
justices in Washington over the summer to discuss the question,63 
but no such meeting was ever held, and by the time they did 
meet in February of 1803, the individual justices had already 
held the circuit courts in place of the displaced circuit judges.64 
that there will be no session of the supreme court of the United States holden in June 
next & that we shall be directed to ride the circuits, before we can consult on the course 
proper to be taken by us, it appears to me proper that the Judges should communicate 
their sentiment on this subject to each that they may act understandingly & in the same 
manner."). See generally Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and 
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753,1782-94 (2003). 
59. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson, April6, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 105-06. He also admitted that he would "be pri-
vately gratified if such should be the opinion of the majority," observing that there was 
"no doubt ... but that policy dictates this decision to us all," while noting that judges "of 
all men" have "the least right to obey" the dictates of policy. Letter from John Marshall 
to William Paterson, May 3, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, 
at 117-18. 
60. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson, May 3, 1802, in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 117. 
61. See Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson, June 11, 1802, in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 120-21; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 
33, at 177 (quoting letter from William Cushing to William Paterson, May 29, 1802). 
62. See Letter from Hannah Cushing to Abigail Adams, June 25, 1802 
(incorporating excerpts of letter from William Paterson to John Marshall, ca. May 25, 
1802), quoted in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 118 n.6. It does 
not appear that Justice Moore voiced support for Justice Chase. See Louis H. Pollak, 
Marshall and the "Campaign of History," 131 U. PA. L. REV. 475,482 (1982) (stating that 
Justice Moore disapproved of the suggestion that the justices not comply with the 
Judiciary Act of 1802); cf. David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466,479 (1983) (noting that Justice Moore "deserve[s] a high 
place in the ranks of the insignificant"); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant 
Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 485-86 (1983) ("On an ex ante 
approach we might award the honors to Alfred Moore by acclamation. Justice Moore, 
who delivered one brief opinion during his four placid terms, showed every promise of 
setting a standard of passive irrelevance for centuries to come; only his resignation 
prevented him from fulfilling his pledge."). 
63. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall, April 24, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 116; also reprinted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, su-
pra note 33, at 177. See also Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson, April 19, 
1802, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 108-09 ("This is a subject 
not be lightly resolved on. The consequences of refusing to carry the law into effect may 
be very serious."). 
64. See Holt, supra note 55, at 16 (noting that the displaced circuit judges, con-
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Thus it was anti-climactic when a judgment rendered by 
Chief Justice Marshall at circuit was upheld against a constitu-
tional challenge (again argued by Charles Lee) six days after 
Marbury,65 particularly since Justice Chase had argued to his col-
leagues that for a Justice to hold the circuit court depended on a 
prior determination that the repeal was valid.66 While Justice 
Cushing rejected this inference, his reasoning underscores the 
unavailability of a remedy for the displaced circuit judges: "It is 
not in our power to restore to them their salaries or them to the 
exercise of their offices. Declining the circuits will have no ten-
dency to do either."67 
The displaced judges never obtained any relief,68 and quo 
warranto never emerged as a significant writ in Supreme Court 
practice.69 
strained by the decision of the justices to hold circuit court, did not attempt to hold the 
court themselves); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference: The 
Shadow of Whittington v. Polk and the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
58, 78-79, 101-05 (2002); O'Fallon, supra note 32, at 239-40; Letter from John Marshall to 
William Paterson, May 3, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 
117-18 ("If we determine certainly to proceed to do circuit duty it will I presume be en-
tirely unnecessary to meet in August."). Professor Weinberg seems to think that the as-
sociate justices had resumed their circuit court duties in the spring of 1802, prior to the 
exchange of letters among the justices that same spring. Weinberg, supra note 14, at 1283 
(stating that the associate justices "had resumed their circuit duties without consulting 
Marshall, in 1802, shortly after the repeal Act went into effect" and relying for this 
proposition on Marshall's April 6, 1802, letter to Paterson). While the repeal act was en-
acted on March 8,1802, its effective date was July 1, 1802. Act of March 8, 1802, §§ 1-3,2 
Stat. 131. The first terms of the revived circuit courts were scheduled for the fall of 1802. 
Act of April 29, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157-58. See also id. § 9, 2 Stat. 156, 163 (providing 
for the transfer of cases to the revived circuit courts as of July 1, 1802). Thus while Mar-
shalllamented in Apri11803 that the June 1802 term of the Supreme Court had been can-
celed-so that there would be no session of the Supreme Court prior to the scheduled 
fall terms of the revived circuit courts-the exchange of letters occurred before the jus-
tices resumed riding circuit in the fall of 1802. 
65. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
66. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall, April 24, 1802, in 6 THE PAPERS 
OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 114; also reprinted in HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra 
note 33, at 175 ("If he executes the office of Circuit Judge, I think he, thereby, decides 
that the repealing act was constitutional. I conceive that he must, before he acts, decide, 
whether the repealing act was constitutional, or not. If he thinks it unconstitutional, he 
cannot act under it.") (emphasis omitted because the two sources differ). See also Holt, 
supra note 55, at 16-17 (noting that when prominent Federalist lawyers objected to the 
circuit court as reconstituted with a Supreme Court justice and a district judge, "[a]s if by 
prearrangement, in each case (save one [Stuart v. Laird)) the same thing happened: upon 
hearing the plea to jurisdiction and before it could be argued, the court adjourned over-
night, consultation occurred between judges and lawyers, and the next day the plea was 
passed over or withdrawn without comment"). 
67. Letter from Hannah Cushing to Abigail Adams, June 25, 1802 (incorporating 
excerpts of letter from William Cushing to Samuel Chase) in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL, supra note 31, at 116 n.5. 
68. Indeed, at least one of them appeared as counsel before the revived circuit 
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Certiorari. The prerogative writ of certiorari "was essen-
tially a royal demand for information."7° Certiorari was used to 
remove indictments "from any inferior court of criminal jurisdic-
tion" into the King's Bench, and was granted "as a matter of 
right" when claimed by the prosecutor.71 In addition, the writ of 
certiorari was used as a means of obtaining additional informa-
tion about a case that was already before the court.72 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not specially provide for the 
writ of certiorari, so that the writ could only be used, pursuant to 
section 14, when "necessary for the exercise" of jurisdiction oth-
erwise given.73 Although we have become accustomed to the Su-
preme Court of the United States using the writ of certiorari to 
bring cases before it, it did not do so until Congress so author-
ized in 1891.74 Until that time, the Supreme Court issued the writ 
of certiorari only "to supply imperfections in the record of a case 
already before it, and not, like a writ of error, to review the 
judgment of an inferior court," nor "to bring up ... for trial a 
case within the exclusive jurisdiction of a higher court. "75 
court which supplanted the very court to which he had been appointed even prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Stuart v. Laird. Holt, supra note 55, at 23 (referring to Eg-
bert Benson); see also id. at 74 n.65 (noting that William Griffith did the same after-
wards). 
69. The chapter of Stern & Gressman's Supreme Court Practice devoted to ex-
traordinary writs docs not even mention quo warranto. See STERN, supra note 53 at 580-
99. In 1820, the Supreme Court held, in an appeal from a decision of a circuit court, that 
quo warranto "could not be maintained except at the instance of the Government." Wal-
lace v. Anderson, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 291, 292 (1820). 
70. de Smith, supra note 18, at 45. 
71. 4 BLACKSTONE at *315-16 (noting that where the defendant seeks certiorari, it 
may be granted "as a matter of discretion" and "therefore it is seldom granted to remove 
indictments from the justices of gaol delivery, or after issue joined or confession of fact in 
any of the courts below"). See also Ex parte Yallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 249 (1863) (ob-
serving that "where such certiorari is allowable, it is awarded at the instance of the king, 
because every indictment is at the suit of the king, and he has a prerogative of suing in 
whatever court he pleases"). 
72. de Smith, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that "where the record of the inferior 
court is alleged to be incomplete ... certiorari issues to order the remainder of the record 
to be returned" ) 
73. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14. 
74. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five 
Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-57 (2000) (discussing the 
first statutory authorization for the use of certiorari to obtain jurisdiction over a case). 
75. American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 
380 (1893); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 258, 259-60 (1876) (noting that, in 
contrast to practice at common law, the Supreme Court of the United States used the 
writ of certiorari only as "auxiliary process ... to obtain further information in respect to 
some matter already before it for adjudication"). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (providing 
that a district court, in a case removed from state court, "may require the [removing 
party) to file with its clerk copies of all record and proceedings in such State court or may 
cause the same to be brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to such State court.") 
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In the certiorari context, the contrast between the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the King's Bench was made quite 
explicitly. In rejecting a motion for certiorari to review the pro-
ceedings of a military commission, the Court stated: 
Our first remark upon the motion for a certiorari, is, that 
there is no analogy between the power given by the Constitu-
tion and law of the United States to the Supreme Court, and 
the other inferior courts of the United States, and to the 
judges of them, to issue such processes, and the prerogative 
power by which it is done in England .... In England, the 
Court of King's Bench has a superintendence over all courts 
of an inferior criminal jurisdiction, and may, by the plenitude 
of its power, award a certiorari to have any indictment re-
moved and brought before it; and where such certiorari is al-
lowable, it is awarded at the instance of the king, because 
every indictment is at the suit of the king, and he has a pre-
rogative of suing in whatever court he pleases. The courts of 
the United States derive authority to issue such a writ from 
the Constitution and the legislation of Congress. 76 
If it seems difficult to imagine the Supreme Court of the 
United States as the nation's equivalent of the King's Bench, 
consider that if one believed that the common law were part of 
national law, one might readily treat the Supreme Court as the 
"highest court of original jurisdiction" armed with the "general 
supervising power" of King's Bench through the use of the pre-
rogative writs.77 And recall that prior to Marbury, and for a time 
76. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 249 (1863). The Court also observed that it 
"was natural, before the sections of the 3d article of the Constitution had been fully con-
sidered in connection with the legislation of Congress ... that by some members of the 
profession it should have been thought, and some of the early judges of the Supreme 
Court also, that the 14th section [of the Judiciary Act of 1789) gave to this court a right to 
originate processes of habeas corpus [and) writs of certiorari to review the proceedings of 
the inferior courts as a matter of original jurisdiction, without being in any way restricted 
by the constitutional limitation" of original jurisdiction. /d. at 252. 
Clement Vallandigham was a "prominent Democratic politician and former Con-
gressman" who had been arrested by Union soldiers "for an anti-war political speech." 
Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 107 (1998). He was convicted after trial before a military 
commission and sentenced to close confinement for the duration of the war, but Presi-
dent Lincoln changed the punishment to banishment to the Confederacy. /d. at 131. Af-
ter using a blockade runner to leave North Carolina, he reached Canada and from there 
ran an unsuccessful campaign as the Democratic nominee for Governor of Ohio. /d. at 
135. President Lincoln was referring to Vallandigham when he asked, "Must I shoot a 
simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator 
who induces him to desert?" /d. at 161. See also DA:'-IIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S 
CONSTITUTI0;-.1 170-71 (2003) (discussing Val/andigham). 
77. See PRESSER, supra note 26, at 243 n.51 ("Given the belief in most of the Su-
preme Court judges in the federal common law of crimes ... it is difficult not to believe 
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afterwards, there were Supreme Court Justices who, while hold-
ing circuit court, did act as if they were judges of the King's 
Bench by adjudicating federal common law criminal prosecu-
tions.78 
For example, in April of 1790, before Congress passed a 
crimes act, two men were indicted, tried, and convicted in the 
circuit court for the district of New York for conspiring to de-
stroy a ship and murder her captain.79 Similarly, in 1797, there 
were four prosecutions in the circuit court for the district of 
Massachusetts involving counterfeit bills of the Bank of the 
United States, which was not then a statutory crime.80 In 1798, 
the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania convicted a de-
fendant for bribing a revenue commissioner, even though that 
was not, at the time, a statutory crime.81 Indeed, it appears that 
Samuel Chase was the only federal judge before 1800 to actually 
reject the idea of a federal common law of crimes.82 
Such common law criminal prosecutions were vehemently 
attacked by the Jeffersonian RepublicansY Jefferson once de-
scribed the assumption of such a common law power as the 
worst thing the Federalists ever did: 
that Marshall and his fellows could not have concocted a simple common law basis for 
the granting of the relatively simple relief sought in Marbury.") 
78. The King's Bench was "the principal court of criminal jurisdiction," with "cog-
nizance of all criminal causes, from high treason down to the most trivial misdemeanor or 
breach of the peace." 4 BLACKSTONE *262. 
79. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE 
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 130 (1995). 
80. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., 1 HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 at 629-30 
(1971); see also Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Good-
win, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 
YALE L. J. 919,920 n.8 (1992) (listing federal common law criminal prosecutions); Stew-
art Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PENN. L. REV. 1003, 1042-73 
(1985) (discussing early federal common law prosecutions). 
81. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766). See 
CASTO, supra note 79, at 141-47. Worrall was unusual in that sentence was imposed even 
though the two judges disagreed regarding the existence of a federal common law of 
crimes. See id. at 147; cf Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 656 n.57 (2002) (explaining that this result may 
have been produced because "the jury had convicted and the Court divided evenly on the 
defendant's motion in arrest of judgment," with the tie resulting in the denial of the mo-
tion). 
82. PRESSER, supra note 26, at 43. See also- 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: THE JUSTICES ON CiRCUIT 
1795-1800, at 322 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990). 
83. See Jay, supra note 80, at 1089 (''It would be an understatement to characterize 
the Republican reaction to the Federalist position on national judicial power that 
emerged in the late 1790's as vehement or caustic."); HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 
33, at 138-42, 159-63. 
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All their other assumptions of un-given power have been in 
the detail. The bank law, the treaty law, the sedition act, alien 
act, the undertaking to change the state laws of evidence in 
the state courts by certain parts of the stamp act, &c., &c, 
have been solitary, inconsequential, timid things, in compari-
son with the audacious, bare-faced and sweeping pretensions 
to a system of law for the US without the adoption of their 
legislature, and so infinitively beyond their power to adopt.84 
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Indeed, the debate over federal common law crimes was 
central to the controversy surrounding the Sedition Act and 
therefore to the 1800 election. Federalist defenders of the Sedi-
tion Act contended that the Act, by permitting truth as a defense 
and empowering the jury to decide law as well as fact, stood as 
an improvement of the common law of sedition that would oth-
erwise be available, while Republicans argued that to treat the 
common law as part of federal law would mean that the national 
government was not a government of limited and enumerated 
powers.85 
Once Jefferson took office in 1801, such prosecutions "were 
effectively precluded" because his "coalition had made such a 
political issue of common-law crimes."86 When an indictment for 
common law sedition was brought and reached the Supreme 
Court in 1812, Republican Attorney General William Pinkney 
refused to argue the case, and the Supreme Court viewed the re-
jection of federal common law crimes as "long since settled in 
public opinion."87 The Court held, without recorded dissent, that 
84. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Randolph, Aug. 18, 1799, reproduced in 
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 479, 480 (1975); see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, 
supra note 33, at 139 (reproducing excerpts of the letter). James Monroe stated his hope 
that "the period is not distant when the sovereignty of the people will be so well estab-
lished, understood and respected as to make a known hatred and hostility to that sover-
eignty, by avowing the application of the English common law to our Constitution ... 
good cause for impeachment." Letter from James Monroe to John Breckenridge (Jan. 
15, 1802), quoted in 1 WARREN, supra note 55,229-30. 
85. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 80, at 936-41; PRESSER, supra note 26, at 66-99. See 
also THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES 
MADISON 251 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973) (if the common law is part of federal law, sub-
ject to legislative revision, "it then follows that the authority of Congress is coextensive 
with the objects of common law; that is to say, with every object of legislation; ... The 
authority of Congress would, therefore, be no longer under the limitations marked out in 
the Constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever."). See 
also O'Fallon, supra note 32, at 237 (noting that the debate over the repeal of the Judici-
ary Act of 1801 reflected that "the willingness of some federal judges to assert the appli-
cability of the common law of seditious libel ... had infuriated the Republicans, whose 
newspapers were the primary target of Federalist prosecutions"). 
86. CASTO, supra note 79, at 162. 
87. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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even if the national government had the "implied power to pre-
serve its own existence," it "would not follow that the Courts of 
that Government are vested with jurisdiction over any particular 
act done by an individual, in supposed violation of the peace and 
dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative authority of the 
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, 
and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the of-
fense."88 
Viewed from this perspective then, Marbury's rejection of 
the prerogative writ of mandamus is a precursor to Bollman's in-
sistence that federal courts can issue the prerogative writ of ha-
beas corpus only as authorized by Congress, and Hudson & 
Goodwin's rejection of a federal common law of crimes. They 
stand together (along with lesser known cases involving the pre-
rogative writs of prohibition and certiorari, and the failure to de-
velop any Supreme Court quo warranto practice) as a rejection 
of the view that the Supreme Court (or its justices holding circuit 
courts) inherited the power of the King's Bench. For that reason, 
I say happy birthday to Marbury v. Madison. 
III. REJECTING THE ATTEMPT TO REVIVE 
THE KING'S BENCH 
Some may view this basis for celebration as a celebration of 
the obvious, and a rather thin excuse for joining a party.89 Maybe 
88. /d. at 33-34. Notice how the language used to describe the view rejected-in 
"violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power"- echoes the language used 
to describe the power of the King's Bench to adjudicate common law crimes: contra 
pacem domini regis (against the peace of the lord the king). See BLACK'S LAW 
OICfiOSARY (7th ed. 1999) (entry for "against the peace and dignity of the state"); id. 
(noting, under entry for "King's peace," that "at one time ... every indictment charged 
the accused with an offense 'against the peace of our Sovereign Lord the King"') (quot-
ing EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 134 (P.B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967)). 
As Blackstone explained, what in other countries was called the "code of criminal law," 
was "more usually denominated with us in England, the doctrine of the pleas of the 
crown: so called, because the king, in whom centers the majesty of the whole community, 
is supposed by the law to be the person injured by every infraction of the public rights 
belonging to that community, and is therefore in all cases the proper prosecutor for every 
public offense." 4 BLACKSTONE *2. "All offenses are either against the king's peace, or 
his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indictment." 1 BLACKSTONE at *258. 
Four years after Hudson and Goodwin, Justice Story attempted to resurrect the 
question, but the Attorney General declined to argue the case, and the Court chose not 
to draw Hudson and Goodwin into doubt. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
415 (1816). See also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federal-
ism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1404-12 (2001) (discussing Hudson and Coolidge as examples 
of judicial compliance with federal lawmaking procedures). 
89. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., 16B FEDERAL PRACfiCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4005, at 103 (1996) ("Clearly Congress has power to limit appellate writ jurisdiction, 
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so; I have vowed to remember that the simple and the everyday 
are cause for celebration. 
Yet if celebrating this aspect of Marbury is celebrating a 
commonplace, it is a commonplace that does sometimes seem to 
be overlooked. For example, Akhil Amar praises the Marbury 
decision for "fashion[ing] judicial relief for a violation of a stat-
ute," a phrasing that seems to suggest that the court did not view 
section 13's authorization of mandamus as necessary.90 The au-
thors of Hart and Wechsler similarly assert, albeit limited to the 
context of original jurisdiction, that "no statutory authorization 
is needed if issuance of an extraordinar~ writ would constitute a 
proper exercise of original jurisdiction." 1 
More generally, much of the debate concerning Congres-
sional control over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction 
seems to assume that the Supreme Court has the inherent power 
to select its own cases through the writ of certiorari. In a recent 
attempt to shift that debate, James Pfander argues that the con-
stitution requires that the Supreme Court have a sufficient arse-
nal of prerogative writs to maintain its supremacy over all infe-
rior federal courts.92 In his view, just as the King's Bench 
exercised supervisory authority over inferior courts in England 
through the prerogative writs, and state supreme courts did the 
same in the United States, the Supreme Court of the United 
just as any other branch of appellate jurisdiction."). Even as robust a supporter of federal 
judicial power as Robert Pushaw has stated that in "contrast to the sovereign prerogative 
of the King's Bench to issue writs, American federal courts had authority to use preroga-
tive writs only to the extent permitted by Congress." Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 447,481 n.l72 (1994); see also Pushaw, supra note 53, at 741 (noting that Ameri-
cans rejected the English notion that "courts were part of the executive branch and thus 
entitled to share in the king's prerogative"); id. at 753 n.76 (noting that Marbury "no-
where suggested that Congress lacked constitutional power to regulate prerogative 
writs"); id. at 827-28 (noting that "whereas the King's Bench exercised the Crown's pre-
rogative to grant extraordinary writs, America had no 'President's Bench' with inherent 
power derived from the executive. Thus, the federal judiciary's writ authority depends 
upon a statutory grant, as both Congress and the Court have always recognized."). 
90. Amar, supra note 14, at 447. This phrasing also sidesteps the obvious point that 
Marbury obtained no relief from the Supreme Court. 
91. RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 312 (5th ed., 2003). Cf Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98 
(1861) (treating mandamus as "nothing more than an action at law between the parties," 
not "as a prerogative writ," and therefore within the Supreme Court's power to "regulate 
and mould the process it uses" in original jurisdiction cases, "'without any further act of 
Congress to regulate its process or confer jurisdiction," but holding that federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, lack power to order the Governor of a State to deliver up 
fugitives from justice as required by the Extradition Clause), overruled by Puerto Rico v. 
Brandstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987). 
92. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 30, at 1500-11. 
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States, by virtue of being a supreme court, must have the consti-
tutional prerogative to supervise inferior federal courts. 
Pfander acknowledges that Marbury foreclosed the possibil-
ity of the Supreme Court of the United States acting as the 
King's Bench with regard to issuing prerogative writs to execu-
tive officers. While he also acknowledges that Marbury (for 
mandamus) and Bollman (for habeas) treat the power to issue 
prerogative writs as subject to Congressional control, he mourns 
these as "lirnit[ing] our conception of the Court's function. "93 He 
ignores the Supreme Court's rejection of any analogy between 
its own powers and the supervisory powers of the King's Bench 
in Kendall (mandamus), Christy (prohibition), and Vallandigham 
(certiorari).94 And he makes no attempt to suggest any inherent 
power in the Supreme Court to issue quo warranto. 
Apart from these historical and doctrinal problems with 
Pfander's claim, there is a fundamental textual difficulty. In his 
view, the judicial power of the United States exercised by the 
Supreme Court has three forms: original, appellate, and supervi-
sory.95 He admits that a "literalist" might object that the "super-
visory powers of the Supreme Court o~erate functionally as part 
of the Court's appellate jurisdiction." 6 The difficulty is deeper 
than this, however. After listing the cases and controversies 
within the federal judicial power, Article III allocates some of 
those cases to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and then 
provides that "[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the su-
preme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction ... with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make."97 That is, Article III, by its terms, treats "all the other 
Cases" as a part of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction-
and therefore subject to Congressional regulations and excep-
tions. By defining the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to 
embrace "all the other Cases" that are not allocated to its origi-
nal jurisdiction, it simply leaves no room for a third category.98 
93. Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1599. 
94. He does discuss Kendall, but not its rejection of the analogy. See id. at 1597-98 
95. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 30, at 1508-09. 
96. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping, supra note 30, at 1508. 
97. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 (emphasis added). 
98. The only way to find a third category is to posit a notion of "judicial power" 
that "extend(s]" beyond the cases and controversies listed in Article III. See Pfander, 
Marbury, supra note 11, at 1599. But section 2 of Article III demonstrates "that the judi-
cial power created and vested by Section 1 will only 'extend' to nine specifically deline-
ated categories of cases or controversies. This enumerated and finite list is written so as 
to make clear that it is to be an exclusive list, just like the exclusive list of congressional 
powers in Article I, Section 8." Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power 
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Finally, it must be remembered that the prerogative writs, 
as their name implies, have their conceptual roots in royal pre-
rogative.99 As Blackstone put it, the royal prerogative consists of 
"those rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in con-
tradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in 
common with any of his subjects: for if once any one prerogative 
of the crown could be held in common with the subject, it would 
cease to be prerogative any longer. ... [T]he prerogative is that 
law in case of the king, which is law in no case of the subject."100 
Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1394 (1994). See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 
U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (stating that Article III, section 2 "delineates the absolute limits on 
the federal courts' jurisdiction"). Indeed, if the "judicial power" somehow extends be-
yond the cases and controversies to which Article III, section 2, says that the "judicial 
power shall extend," then the entire body of constitutional law which insists on limiting 
the federal judiciary to the enumerated cases and controversies is for naught. Three Jus-
tices once suggested that Congress may utilize its Article I powers to authorize Article III 
courts to decide matters beyond the enumeration in Article III, section 2, see National 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater, 337 U.S. 582,599 (1949) (Jackson, J., announcing the 
judgment of the Court), but every other justice emphatically rejected this view. /d. at 604 
(Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring in the judgment but noting, "I strongly 
dissent from the reasons" given in Justice Jackson's opinion); id. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., 
joined by Reed, dissenting) (arguing that "if courts established under Article III can ex-
ercise wider jurisdiction than that defined and confined by Article III, ... what justifica-
tion is there for interpreting Article III as imposing one restriction ... -the restriction to 
the exercise of 'judicial power' -yet not interpreting it as imposing the restrictions that 
are most explicit, namely, the particularization of the 'cases' to which 'the judicial Power 
shall extend'?"); id. at 642 (Vinson, C.J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the "appellate jurisdiction of this Court is, in fact, dependent upon the fact that the case 
reviewed is of a kind within the Art. III enumeration"). 
The power of courts to promulgate rules of procedure pursuant to a legislative dele-
gation of authority is not itself the exercise of judicial power. Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 388-89 (1989). Instead, such lawmaking power has been justified as a per-
missible extrajudicial activity. /d. at 389-90; cf. id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (treating 
such lawmaking as ancillary to the exercise of judicial powers). See also Sibbach v. Wil-
son & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to regulate the prac-
tice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or 
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Consti-
tution of the United States."); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1825) (using the 
power granted in section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 "to make and establish all neces-
sary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts" as an example of a per-
missible delegation of Congressional power). But see Pushaw, supra note 53, at 759 n.lOO 
(noting that "legislative delegation of adjective lawmaking had been commonplace for 
centuries" in our legal culture, but that the Supreme Court "has never supplied a full ex-
planation"); MARTIN H. REDISH FEDERAL JURISD!CfiON: TENSIONS IN THE 
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 170-71 (2d ed., 1980) (arguing that the Rules Ena-
bling Act is unconstitutional). 
99. de Smith, supra note 18, at 40 (noting that the "name indicates that it is a writ 
especially associated with the King"); id. at 40-41 (noting that while not all prerogative 
writs were originally issued only at the suit of the king, it is "nevertheless true ... that 
when in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these various writs came to be called 
'prerogative', it was because they were conceived as being intimately connected with the 
rights of the Crown"). 
100. 1 BLACKSTONE at *232. 
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The prerogative writs were issued in the king's name, by the 
king's courts, to vindicate the king's interests. 
To gain some perspective on the status under our constitu-
tion of the prerogative writs, then, consider our constitution's 
treatment of royal prerogatives more generally. 
• In order to "support his dignity and maintain his power," 
the king had various fiscal prerogatives.101 Under our constitu-
tion, Congress has the power to "lay and collect Taxes,"102 and 
all bills to do so must originate in the House of Representa-
tives.103 
• The king had the "sole power of sending embassadors to 
foreign states, and receiving embassadors at home."104 Under our 
constitution, the President "shall receive Ambassadors,"105 but 
needs the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," to appoint am-
bassadors. 106 
• The king had the power to make treaties, leagues, and al-
liances, as well as the "sole prerogative of making war and 
peace,"107 and "directing the ministers of the crown to issue let-
ters of marque and reprisal."108 Under our constitution, the 
President may make treaties, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, "provided two thirds of the Senators present concur,"109 
and Congress is given the power to "declare War," and to "grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal. "110 
• The king had the "prerogative of rejecting such provisions 
in parliament, as he judges improper to be passed."111 Under our 
constitution, the President has the veto power, but Congress may 
override that veto by a two thirds vote of each house.112 
• The king had the "sole power of raising and regulating 
fleets and armies, "113 and the power to command a subject not to 
101. 1 BLACKSTONE at *271-326. 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The President's compensation may not be either "en-
creased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected." U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1. 
103. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
104. 1 BLACKSTONE at *245. 
105. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
106. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
107. 1 BLACKSTONE at *249. 
108. 1 BLACKSTONE at *250. 
109. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
110. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
111. 1 BLACKSTONE at *253. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7. 
113. 1 BLACKSTONE at *254. 
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leave the realm or to return to it.114 Under our constitution, Con-
gress has the power to "raise and support Armies," and to "pro-
vide and maintain a Navy."115 
• As the person injured by a crime, the king had the pre-
rogative of pardon.116 Under our constitution, the President has 
the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against 
the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."117 
• As the fountain of honor, office, and privilege, the king 
had the prerogative of "erecting and disposing of offices," as 
well as "conferring dignities and honours," converting aliens into 
denizens, and erecting corporations.118 Under our constitution, 
the President has the power, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to appoint officers to offices "which shall be established 
by Law," 119 but "[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the 
United States."12° Congress has the power to "establish an uni-
form Rule of Naturalization," 121 and, where necessary and 
proper to carry out any of the national government's powers, to 
erect corporations.122 
• As the arbiter of commerce, the king had the prerogative 
to establish markets, regulate weights and measures, and coin 
money. 123 Under our constitution, Congress has the power to 
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States," and to "coin Money, regulate the Value thereof ... 
and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures."124 
• As the head of the national church, the king had the in-
herent prerogative to convene and dissolve ecclesiastical synods 
or convocations. 125 Under our constitution, "no religious Test 
114. 1 BLACKSTONE at *256. Cf Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (noting that 
"[p]rior to 1856, when there was no statute on the subject, the common perception was 
that the issuance of a passport was committed to the sole discretion of the Executive and 
that the Executive would exercise this power in the interests of the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States."). See Patricia Bellia, Executive Power in Youngs· 
town's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 126-29 (2002) (discussing executive authority 
regarding passports). 
115. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
116. 1 BLACKSTONE at *259. 
117. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
118. 1 BLACKSTONE at *262-63. 
119. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. 
120. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9. 
121. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819). 
123. 1 BLACKSTONE at *263-67. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
125. 1 BLACKSTONE at *269. 
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shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States,"126 and the first amendment 
added that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion. "127 
• The king had the prerogative to convene the parliament, 
prorogue it for a time, or dissolve it.128 Under our constitution, 
the President "may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them,"129 but without regard to presidential 
summons, "Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
Year."130 Moreover, "[n]either House, during the Session of 
Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for 
more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which 
the two Houses shall be sitting,"131 with the President's adjourn-
ment power arising only "in Case of Disagreement between" the 
Houses. 132 
In short, our constitution allocates the royal prerogatives 
between Congress (or a House thereof) and the President, and 
usually divides the prerogative in a way that both Congress and 
President have a role.133 While the precise allocation between 
Congress and the President has been a matter of dis~ute since at 
least Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in 1793, 34 that long-
126. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
127. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
128. 1 BLACKSTONE at *146, 180. 
129. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
130. As originally adopted, the constitution provided that "such Meeting shall be on 
the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." U.S. 
CoNST., Art. I, § 4. The twentieth amendment reiterated that "Congress shall assemble 
at least once in every year," but changed the default date to January 3. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XX. 
131. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 5. 
132. U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 3. 
133. The only prerogatives that are for the President alone are the power to receive 
foreign ambassadors and the power to pardon offenses against the United States. The 
President has a role, through the recommendation power of Article II, section 3, and the 
veto power of Article I, section 7, in those prerogatives that may appear at first blush to 
be assigned exclusively to Congress. 
134. In the wake of Washington's Proclamation, Alexander Hamilton published a 
series of essays in defense of presidential power under the pseudonym Pacificus, and was 
answered by James Madison writing as Helvidius. See THE LETTERS OF PAC!FICUS AND 
HELVIDIUS (1845) with THE LETTERS OF AMERICANUS (Richard Loss, editor, facsimile 
reproduction 1976). One of Madison's arguments was that Hamilton must have borrowed 
his conception of presidential power from the "power of making treaties and the power 
of declaring war" being "royal prerogatives in the British government." Id. at 62 
(Helvidius No.1, Aug. 24, 1793). See also David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: 
The Third Congress, 1793·1795, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-11 (1996); William Michael Tre-
anor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 745-
48 (1997). 
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standing dispute should not distract us from the point most rele-
vant here: None is allocated to the judiciary. 
Indeed, the only prerogative writ mentioned in the constitu-
tion-the writ of habeas corpus-was the one that had departed 
most from its royal roots, having been turned against the king 
himself.135 Yet, as we have seen, even the writ of habeas corpus, 
which our constitution protects against suspension/36 cannot be 
issued by the Supreme Court without Congressional authoriza-
tion. 
Consideration of one last royal prerogative should make 
clear that our constitution does not bestow any prerogative 
135. Sec de Smith, supra note 18, at 53 (asserting that it was "sound politics" to asso-
ciate habeas corpus "with the King's personal solicitude for the welfare of his subjects" 
and noting that the value of habeas "became enhanced during the constitutional struggles 
of the seventeenth century-albeit, paradoxically, as a safeguard of the liberty of the 
king's political opponents-and it came to be regarded, with Magna Carta, as the great-
est bastion of individual liberty"); 1 BLACKSTONE at 131 ("if any person be restrained of 
his liberty ... by command of the king's majesty in person ... he shall ... have a writ of 
habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of king's bench ... who shall determine 
whether the cause of his commitment be just ... ") (citing the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679). See also Farber, supra note 76, at 161 (noting that the "whole thrust of English 
history had been to move the power [to suspend habeas] to Parliament; it was not a 
power the king possessed at the time of American independence"); Ex parte Merryman, 
17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) ("The most exciting contests between the crown 
and the people of England, from the time of Magna Carta, were in relation to the privi-
lege of this writ. ... "). 
136. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9. Thus even though federal courts may not issue writs of 
habeas corpus without statutory authorization, Congress may be constitutionally obli-
gated to provide some means by which the writ is available. See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95 ("It 
may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United 
States, sitting under a constitution which had declared 'that the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety might require it.' Acting under the immediate influence of this injunc-
tion, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means 
by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the 
means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its sus-
pension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the 
courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus."). 
Note that the Constitutional Convention first discussed and adopted the suspension 
clause in the context of a debate concerning the judiciary article, see lAMES MADISON, 
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 541 (reprinted Ohio 
University Press, 1984), but the Committee on Style moved it to the article dealing with 
legislative power. See Farber, supra note 76, at 160-61. 
In addition to being constitutionally protected, habeas corpus is unique in another 
way: It "has always been asymmetrical .... The prisoner always can sue for the writ, but 
the warden can't bring a declaratory judgment suit against the prisoner." Argument of 
Henry P. Monaghan at 3, Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (No. 95-8836). Unlike 
the other prerogative writs that could be used by the Supreme Court to restrict liberty by 
constraining more libertarian inferior courts, habeas corpus operates as a liberty-
enhancing ratchet. To the extent, then, that the point of insisting on a supervisory power 
in the Supreme Court is to protect liberty, it misses the mark. Supervisory power in gen-
eral may protect or reduce liberty. 
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power on the judiciary. As the fountain of justice, the king had 
"alone the right of erecting courts of judicature."137 Under our 
constitution, Congress has the Eower to "constitute Tribunals in-
ferior to the Supreme Court."1 8 While the Constitution itself es-
tablishes that there shall be a Supreme Court,139 it is Congress 
that is given the power to "make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution ... all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution ... in any Department" of the United 
States-including the judicial power vested in the Supreme 
Court.140 
Without support from prerogative writ practice and the 
analogy to the King's Bench, Pfander's argument must rely di-
rectly on the constitutional requirement that any court estab-
lished by Congress be "inferior to the supreme Court. "141 The 
requirement of inferiority may, however, refer to status, or 
breadth of geographic and subject matter jurisdiction, or even 
the obligation to follow precedent.142 Yet even if this constitu-
tional requirement of inferiority refers to a relationship of hier-
archical power, so long as Congress provides that some judg-
ments of any court it creates can be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court in some way (and not vice versa), such a court is "inferior 
to" the Supreme Court.143 
So understood, the requirement of inferiority dovetails with 
the constitutional provision for Supreme Court appellate juris-
diction in all cases not allocated to its original jurisdiction, "with 
137. 1 BLACKSTONE at *257. 
138. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
139. U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 1. 
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Cf Marbury, 5 U.S. at 147 (argument of Charles Lee 
that the power to issue mandamus is "a beneficial, and a necessary power"). 
141. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8; see also U.S. CONST. art. Ill,§ 1. 
142. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 29, at 1180 n.139 (noting that the words "su-
preme" and "inferior" were probably used in the same sense in the Constitution as in 
Blackstone's Commentaries: to distinguish between courts "subject to narrow geographic 
and subject matter restraints" and courts not subject to such restraints); Evan Caminker 
Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 838 
(1994) (arguing that supreme-inferior relationship requires following precedent). Cf 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997) (stating that in the context of the 
appointments clause of Article II, "whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on 
whether he has a superior," not on whether one has a lower rank or less important re-
sponsibilities). 
143. Professor Caminker asserts that "basing the Court's constitutional supremacy 
solely on its powers of reversal demands that the Supreme Court have plenary appellate 
jurisdiction over every case." Caminker, supra note 142, at 832. But within the context of 
a particular judicial hierarchy, if there are situations in which A can reverse the judg-
ments of B, and B can never reverse the judgments of A, then B IS mfenor to A, even 1f 
there are many situations in which A cannot reverse the judgments of B. 
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such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress 
shall make."144 That is, a court created by Congress that is sub-
ject to some appellate review by the Supreme Court-in what-
ever cases that Congress has not excepted from such review-is 
inferior to the Supreme Court. Some might view it as "absurd" 
to treat a court as "inferior" to the Supreme Court if the Su-
preme Court could review its judgments only in (say) patent 
cases-just as Henry Hart suggested fifty years ago that some 
might view it as "absurd" to treat as an "exception" to the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction a statute that excluded eve-
rything except patent cases. 145 Significantly, it was at precisely 
this juncture that Hart insisted that it was possible to "lay down 
a measure" that would limit Congressional power while avoiding 
the claimed absurdity: "The measure is simply that the excep-
tions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the 
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan."146 
Shorn of reliance on the analogy to the prerogative powers 
of the King's Bench, then, the argument for a constitutionally 
required supervisory power in the Supreme Court ultimately de-
pends on a conviction that the Supreme Court has some "essen-
tial role." 147 And the response on Marbury's two hundredth 
birthday is the same that Hart's co-author Herbert Wechsler 
gave to Hart: 
[T]he plan of the Constitution for the courts ... was quite 
simply that the Congress would decide from time to time how 
far the federal judicial institution should be used within the 
limits of the federal judicial power. ... Federal courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional ques-
tions because there is a special function vested in them to en-
force the Constitution or police the other agencies of the 
government. They do so rather for the reason that they must 
decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdic-
tion and in doing so must give effect to the supreme law of the 
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
145. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953). 
146. /d. 
147. See Pfander, Marbury, supra note 11, at 1602 (stating that "Article III may con-
template a special role for the Supreme Court of the United States as the constitutionally 
mandated leader of a hierarchical judicial department"). But see Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping, supra note 30, at 1501 (concluding that his approach is preferable to Hart's 
"essential function" approach). 
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land. That is, at least, what Marbury v. Madison was all 
about. 148 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever else one thinks about Marbury, it rejected a vi-
sion of the Supreme Court as a court that inherited the preroga-
tive power of the King's Bench. It recognized that, under our re-
publican constitution, the federal judiciary lacks any prerogative 
not given it by the representatives of the people. Happy birth-
day. 
148. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 
1005-06 (1965). 
